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Abstract 
G.A. Cohen is famous for his critique of John Rawls’s view that principles of justice are restricted in 
scope to institutional structures.  In recent work, however, Cohen has suggested that Rawlsians get more 
than just the scope of justice wrong: they get the concept wrong too. He claims that justice is a 
fundamental value, i.e., a moral input in our deliberations about the content of action guiding regulatory 
principles, rather than the output.  In this paper, I argue that Cohen’s arguments for extending the scope of 
justice equivocate across his distinction between fundamental principles of justice, i.e., principles that tell 
us what justice is; and regulatory principles of justice, i.e., principles that tell us what is required of us all 
things, including justice, considered.  Though Cohen initially had the regulatory sense of the word 
‘justice’ in mind when critiquing the basic structure restriction, his replies to the problem of 
demandingness presuppose his own, fundamental sense of the word ‘justice’.  The upshot is that he 
escapes demandingness at the cost of sacrificing regulatory justice’s capacity to provide clear guidance.  I 
conclude the paper by considering Peter Singer’s efforts to deal with demandingness in his own work on 
global poverty.  Since Singer manages to deal with demandingness without giving up clarity, his work is a 
good a place to start in the search for regulatory principles that are suitable for the context of personal 
choice.         
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1.  Introduction 
G.A. Cohen is well known within contemporary political philosophy for his critique of economic 
incentives (Cohen 1992),i as well as for his related claim that the Difference Principle extends to the 
context of personal choice (Cohen 1997).ii  More recently, he’s also received attention for his conceptual 
2 
 
claim that justice is a fundamental value, i.e., that justice is one of the normative inputs involved in the 
justificatory process via which action guiding ‘regulatory’ principles are selected, rather than the output 
(Cohen 2008, 269-272 and chapter 7).iii  However, very little effort has been made thus far to explore the 
possibility of a relationship between these claims.iv  This is surprising.  According to Cohen, the 
Difference Principle is a derivative, fact-dependent principle, and despite important factual differences 
between the personal and institutional contexts, he nonetheless maintains that its scope of justified 
application is wide enough to extend to both.  Isn’t there a tension here, though?  It may make sense to 
think that justice, if a fundamental value, applies to both of these contexts.  By contrast, if, like John 
Rawls, one thinks of it as a set of fact-dependent principles, then the claim that principles of justice 
suitable for institutions have a wide scope of justified application is prima facie implausible.v    
 In this paper, I argue that Cohen’s attack on the basic structure restriction equivocates across his 
distinction between fundamental principles of justice, i.e., principles that tell us what justice is; and 
regulatory principles of justice, i.e., principles that tell us what is required of us all things, including 
justice, considered.  Though Cohen initially had the regulatory sense of the word ‘justice’ in mind when 
critiquing Rawls’s institutional focus, a number of Cohen’s replies to Rawls’s defenders presuppose 
Cohen’s own, fundamental sense of the word ‘justice’.  More specifically, his replies to the problem of 
demandingness treat the Difference Principle as if it expresses a defeasible requirement that must be 
balanced against competing values, and as if considerations of measurability are external to its 
justification.  By treating it this way, Cohen seriously compromises the Difference Principle’s clarity: he 
makes it such that citizens who follow it will often be unable to tell when they have or haven’t met its 
requirements.  This lack of clarity, in turn, runs afoul of the requirements of publicity and also reduces the 
Difference Principle’s capacity for ‘regulation’, i.e., its capacity to guide action.    
 After making my case for the conclusion that Cohen equivocates, I move on to argue that lack of 
clarity in a distributive regulatory principle does more than compromise publicity and the capacity for 
action guidance: it leads to unchosen inequality of burden, too, as some of those who follow it will 
inadvertently do more than is required of them and some will inadvertently do less.  Collectively, the 
difficulties associated with lack of clarity suggest we have good reason to prefer an alternative to the 
Difference Principle, at least for the context of personal decision making.  In the final section, I consider 
Peter Singer’s public standard of assistance as a model for such an alternative (Singer 2010, chapter 10).  
Like Cohen’s version of the Difference Principle, Singer’s public standard is responsive to the problem 
posed by demandingness.  Unlike Cohen, however, Singer manages to respond to demandingness without 
also sacrificing clarity.  For that reason, Singer’s work is worth considering as we try to determine what 
are the regulatory principles best suited for the personal context.           
2. Scope and Status in Cohen’s Critique of Rawls 
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Cohen’s canonical objection to the exclusion of personal choice from the scope of distributive justice 
emerges from his critique of Rawls’s use of economic incentives.  As most readers of Rawls are aware, 
the theory of justice he proposes, though largely egalitarian, permits inequalities necessary to facilitate the 
development and exercise of economically productive talents.  Such inequalities are consistent with 
justice, he claims, when they satisfy the Difference Principle, i.e., when they’re necessary to maximally 
improve the position of the worst off group in society (Rawls 1971, 75-83).  Cohen’s critique of this 
position begins with the observation that ‘necessary’ admits of more than one interpretation.  On an 
intention independent reading of it, inequalities are only necessary if the talented are literally unable to 
exercise and develop their talents without them, e.g., if those undergoing particularly stressful training 
required more costly forms of leisure in order to be capable of completing it.  Interpreted this way, the 
word ‘necessary’ leaves very little room for inequality.  On an intention relative reading, however, it 
allows for a great deal more, as inequalities created by incentives are now also acceptable (Cohen 2008, 
68-69).  As Cohen indicates, it is the talented themselves who make inequalities of this sort necessary, for 
it is only necessary to offer incentives if the talented would refrain from raising their economic 
productivity without them (Cohen 2008, 48-54).  If this is the case, though, then in what sense can it be 
said that the talented members of a just society personally affirm its principles?  If, as Rawls claims, the 
citizens of a just society affirm the Difference Principle and the arguments in favor of it (Rawls 1971, 
453-454), then how can they consistently make their productivity contingent upon receiving greater 
benefits?  Citizens who believe in the injustice of unnecessary inequalities presumably wouldn’t choose to 
make them necessary by demanding incentives.  As such, Cohen maintains that Rawls’s endorsement of 
economic incentives is inconsistent with the ethos his conception of justice incorporates (Cohen 2008, 
121-122).vi   
 In response to the above argument, Cohen contemplates a potential objection that Rawls’ 
supporters might press.  According to Rawls, “the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of 
society”, i.e., its “political constitution and…principal economic and social arrangements” (Rawls 1971, 
7).  In other words, his principles of justice are specifically intended to apply to institutional structures.  If 
this is so, then there would appear to be nothing inconsistent about affirming the Difference Principle 
while also demanding incentive payments.  Since its scope is restricted, citizens who affirm it needn’t 
apply it to their personal choices (Cohen 2008, 124-125).vii   
 Cohen’s reply to the above line of argument is relatively straightforward.  First, he notes that 
Rawls’s stated reason for making the basic structure the subject of justice is the profound impact it has on 
one’s endowment of opportunities and resources, and thus on what one can reasonably expect out of life 
(Rawls 1971, 7).  Second, he notes that citizens’ personal choices collectively also have a profound 
impact on any individual’s endowment of opportunities and resources, in part through their constitutive 
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relationship with informal institutions like the family (Cohen 2008, 134-135).  His conclusion is that 
Rawls cannot consistently exclude personal choice from the scope of the Difference Principle (Cohen 
2008, 137-137).viii   
 It is the above claim in particular: the claim that Rawls cannot consistently endorse the basic 
structure restriction, which has attracted the most critical attention.  Rawls’s defenders frequently argue 
that profundity of effect, though important, is not the only factor relevant to the Difference Principle’s 
scope of application.  They claim that Rawls’s endorsement of the basic structure restriction proves to be 
consistent once other pertinent considerations are taken into account, e.g., considerations such as the 
limits of what justice can reasonably demand from citizens,ix the requirements of publicity (Williams 
1998), the causal influence a society’s institutions have over its ethos (J. Cohen 2002), etc. 
 In the next section, I further discuss the issues demandingness and publicity pose for Cohen ‘s 
canonical critique.  For the time-being, however, let’s return to the present section’s exegesis of his views.  
As I mentioned in the introduction, my argument in the next section is that Cohen’s attack on the basic 
structure restriction equivocates across his distinction between fundamental justice and regulatory justice: 
though his canonical critique is about the scope of regulatory ‘justice’, a number of his replies to Rawls’s 
defenders presuppose the fundamental sense of the word ‘justice’.  To better understand why, though, it 
will be helpful to first say a bit about the conceptual critique of Rawls that Cohen launches in the later 
part of his career.   
 According to Cohen’s conceptual critique, Rawls is wrong to think that specifying the content of 
justice is a matter of specifying principles suitable for guiding political practice.  On Cohen’s view, 
justice is a fundamental value, i.e., one of the normative inputs involved in the justificatory process via 
which action guiding institutional principles are selected, rather than the output (Cohen 2008, chapter 7).x  
This claim is embedded in a pluralistic picture of the meta-ethical universe.  For Cohen, morality is 
comprised of a plurality of irreducible, fundamental values that sometimes conflict with each other 
(Cohen 2008, 3-6).  As a result, any principle expressing the content of a fundamental value, e.g., a 
principle of efficiency, a principle of community, a principle of compassion, etc., is only indirectly 
normative on Cohen’s view.  Such a principle tells us how to evaluate a society with respect to one of the 
moral elements in light of which it is or isn’t morally desirable, but it can’t by itself tell a legislator what 
to do (Cohen 2008, 268 and 306-307).xi  To identify justice as a fundamental value, then, is to identify it 
as a tool directly useful for evaluating the justice or injustice of a society, but only indirectly useful for 
determining how a society ought to be run.  Prescribing institutional arrangements requires formulating 
what Cohen calls ‘rules of regulation’, i.e., formulating derivative principles the content of which reflect 
considerations other than just justice, e.g., considerations of efficiency, stability, compassion, etc. (Cohen 
2008, 253, 263-268, and 276-286).   
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 Two characteristics of fundamental justice implicit in the above description are worth 
highlighting before we move on to the next section.  It is in light of these characteristics that Cohen’s 
replies to critics are sometimes equivocal.  The first is that fundamental justice is defeasible.  As one 
value within a pluralistic moral universe, fundamental justice is subject to trade-offs.  Unlike regulatory 
justice, which represents the weightings we’ve assigned to competing values, fundamental justice is one 
of the values that must be weighed, and we must be careful not to accord it an excessive degree of moral 
significance.   
 The second characteristic of interest is that many considerations are external to fundamental 
justice.  On Cohen’s view, much that is morally significant is nonetheless irrelevant to justifying a 
conception of fundamental justice.xii  Cohen’s view on this matter is partially traceable to his value 
pluralism.  Fairness, community, efficiency, compassion, etc., are all different values and it’s important 
that considerations belonging to one be kept separate from the others when filling out their content.  In 
addition, though, it’s traceable to his exclusiveness about justice, i.e., to his view that justice is a 
relatively simple value rather than a complex value with many internal aspects.  Undoubtedly fairness is 
an internal consideration: if something is unfair then it is also, to that extent, unjust (Cohen 2008, 6-8).  
Furthermore, on Cohen’s view, egalitarianism supplies the right conception of fairness in distribution, 
specifically Luck Egalitarianism (Cohen 1989).xiii  Though Cohen sometimes seems to think that nothing 
but fairness is internal to justice, and thus that any conflict between fairness and other moral 
considerations is a conflict between justice and non-justice considerations, there are places where he 
relaxes this narrowness somewhat.  In Why not Socialism? he expresses some uncertainty about whether 
community is internal to justice (Cohen 2009, 37), and in “Fairness and Legitimacy in Justice” he 
concedes that justice also has a historical component that he, as the title suggests, calls ‘legitimacy’ 
(Cohen 2011).  Notwithstanding these exceptions, Cohen’s view of what qualifies as a consideration of 
justice is a narrow one that excludes many considerations, e.g., efficiency, measurability, stability, etc.  
Such considerations are pertinent to justifying principles of regulation, on his view, but they are external 
to the project of justifying a conception of fundamental justice.                      
 In the next section, I’ll chart some of the literary terrain surrounding Cohen’s critique of 
incentives and Rawls’s basic structure restriction.  In particular, I’ll focus on the literature surrounding the 
worry that applying the Difference Principle in the context of personal choice is excessively demanding.  
Cohen’s replies to this worry presuppose that when he uses the term ‘justice’, he has in mind a particular 
fundamental value.  Unfortunately, the issue he and his opponents are debating is not whether a 
fundamental value extends to the context of personal choice, but whether the Difference Principle does, 
and the Difference Principle, as we’ve noted, is a regulatory output intended to guide institutional design, 
not a justificatory input.    
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3. Demandingness, Subjective Welfare, and Cohen’s Personal Prerogative 
An important difference between the contexts of institutional design and personal choice is that people, 
unlike institutions, have personal lives.  In light of this, the requirement that citizens embody the 
Difference Principle in their everyday lives appears rather demanding.  It seems to entail that well off 
citizens are morally required to devote a tremendous amount of their time and energy to helping the worst 
off.xiv  To fully appreciate this worry, it’s helpful to consider the kinds of behaviour Cohen’s ethos would 
motivate.  On the one hand, an ethos can contribute to the justness of a distribution by supplementing 
institutional measures.  Supplementation, according to Cohen, occurs when ethos motivated actions are 
pursued independently of public justice seeking measures, e.g., making personal donations or 
volunteering during one’s spare time. Enhancement, in contrast, is ethos motivated action that’s conjoined 
with public justice seeking measures.  Such would include, for instance, continuing to work just as hard 
under a radical tax regime as one would under a less radical one, or choosing to take on an economically 
productive profession for which one’s talents are well suited in spite of the fact that said tax regime 
disallows incentives (Cohen 2008, 375).  Examples like these highlight just how pervasive Cohen’s ethos 
would be if realized.  It would ostensibly require one to prioritize the worst off whenever distributive 
considerations are relevant, and there are a great many situations where they are.       
 Cohen’s reply to the above worry is not dismissive.  He attempts to accommodate it by qualifying 
his ethos with a personal prerogative to pursue other matters, e.g., self-interest, expressing affection to 
one’s loved ones, non-justice moral commitments, etc. (Cohen 2008, 70-72).xv  As such, an individual 
who finds him/herself in possession of extra cash might legitimately choose to keep a portion of it for 
some purpose other than benefitting the worst off, and someone who’d make an exceptional engineer 
might justifiably choose a different career, so long as these choices don’t exceed the bounds of a 
reasonable (and unspecified) limit on the extent to which deviating from the Difference Principle is 
permissible.xvi  But even if his ethos were not so qualified, Cohen claims that it would only require a 
work-till-you-drop duty if one mistakenly leaves subjective welfare out of one’s metric.  If one’s metric 
incorporates subjective welfare in addition to resources, then inequalities in resource endowment will 
sometimes be justified in order to compensate the talented for their labor burdens (Cohen 2008, 101-109).  
Furthermore, including welfare means those with greater talents needn’t enslave themselves to the 
betterment of the worse off if doing so would require sacrificing too much of it.  The talented, should they 
become sufficiently miserable, would themselves become the worst off group, so it cannot be said that a 
welfare inclusive metric would require them to utterly devote themselves to promoting the betterment of 
the untalented (Cohen 2008, 402-403).xvii   
 In his article “Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity,” Andrew Williams argues that Cohen’s 
Difference Principle based ethos is incapable of meeting Rawls’ publicity condition, i.e., that citizens who 
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embrace it will not be able to discern when and where the requirements of the ethos have been adequately 
satisfied.  Williams offers a number of considerations in support of this conclusion, but many revolve 
around the inclusion of subjective welfare and Cohen’s personal prerogative qualification.  As Williams 
correctly notes, determining whether an individual with greater than average resources has satisfied her 
justice related duties requires checking to see if her extra wealth either compensates for labors burden or 
is consistent with a legitimate personal prerogative (Williams 1998, 238).  In order to check the first of 
these, one must be able to interpersonally compare levels of job satisfaction.  Unfortunately, doing so 
appears to be beyond our epistemic abilities.  Distinguishing the effect of someone’s occupation on her 
welfare from the effects of other welfare impacting factors in her personal life is very difficult.  What’s 
more, self-deception about job satisfaction is common (Williams 1998, 239).  As a result, acquiring the 
information needed to reliably determine which of those with more resources are ‘burdened’ by their jobs 
is extremely difficult, especially on a society-wide scale.   
 Equally difficult is determining whether the greater resourced have exceeded the bounds of a 
legitimate personal prerogative.  At what point does deviating from the pursuit of justice for the sake of 
other projects cease to be permissible?  Cohen does not attempt to specify this, and the reason for that 
may be because the answer might vary from person to person depending on their personal history, 
circumstances, etc. (Williams 1998, 239-240).   
 In sum, Cohen’s replies to the problem of demandingness make an ethos based on the Difference 
Principle more palatable, but at the cost of citizens being unable to determine whether their co-citizens are 
fulfilling their duties.  In fact, the above mentioned difficulties suggest that a citizen will have difficulty 
telling whether she herself has fulfilled her duties (Am I ‘burdened’ by my job relative to others?  When 
does the pursuit of my self-interest become impermissible?).           
 As worrisome as Williams’ objections are, they become even more worrisome when we’re 
reminded that the Difference Principle, on Cohen’s view, is a regulatory principle that reflects but is 
distinct from justice itself.  Its function is not to tell us what justice is, but to tell us what we ought to do, 
all things, including justice, considered.  If this is the function of a distributive regulatory principle, 
though, then being unable to tell whether one has successfully followed it clearly undermines that 
function.  This is especially obvious with respect to the idea of a personal prerogative in particular.  To 
see what I have in mind, consider again Cohen’s discussion of how competing values operate.  Rawls’s 
mistake, Cohen claims, is allowing non-justice considerations to influence the content of his conception 
of justice.  Since justice is a fundamental value, other values such as efficiency or compassion specifically 
limit the weight it can reasonably be accorded when adopting distributive regulatory principles, i.e., they 
constrain justice’s implementation, not its content.  If this is the manner in which external values relate to 
justice, however, then there’s a tension between Cohen’s conceptual critique of the Difference Principle 
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and his claim that the demands it imposes are constrained by a personal prerogative. Since the Difference 
Principle is regulatory and thus allegedly distinct from justice itself, its content should be justified in light 
of the various considerations that must be given weight in the personal context.  If, upon reflection, we 
decide that strictly adhering to the Difference Principle would not leave enough space for self-interest, 
affection, and the various moral considerations that stand prominent in the personal context (loyalty to 
friends, for example), then we have reason to adopt another principle better tailored for the personal realm 
instead.  Cohen’s strategy of retaining the Difference Principle but constraining it with a personal 
prerogative is responsive to the importance of leaving space for self-interest, personal moral 
commitments, etc., but his strategy also deprives the Difference Principle of its capacity for action 
guidance by requiring us to balance it against competing considerations in much the same manner that we 
balance conflicting values against each other.  As a result, Cohen’s personal prerogative qualification 
treats the Difference Principle as if it is a principle of fundamental justice, and thus it constitutes an 
equivocal reply to the demandingness objection.      
 A further instance of equivocation is identifiable in Cohen’s rationale for including subjective 
welfare in the Difference Principle’s metric.  In a footnote from chapter 2 of Rescuing Justice and 
Equality, Cohen writes: “Had I written the article that is the substance of the present chapter after I had 
reached the distinction drawn in chapter 6 between fundamental principles and rules of regulation, I 
would have said that labor burdens must come into the assessment of fundamental justice, however 
difficult it may be to represent them, even by proxy, within rules of regulation (Cohen 2008, footnote 48 
on p. 106).”  Why does Cohen think that fundamental justice requires accounting for labor burdens?  To 
understand the answer, it will be helpful to recall our discussion of internality and externality in the 
previous section.  As we’ve noted, Cohen thinks it’s important that considerations belonging to one 
fundamental value be kept separate from considerations belonging to others when formulating 
conceptions of their content.  With respect to justice in particular, judgments of fairness are internal, 
while most other judgments, e.g., judgments of efficiency, are external.  As a result, if judgments of 
fairness direct us to include subjective welfare in the metric of our conception of fundamental justice, thus 
making it responsive to labor burden, then we presumably ought to do so.  Cohen’s favored judgment to 
this effect is the one associated with the wheelchair bound individual in “On the Currency of Egalitarian 
Justice.”  This person is able to raise his arms, but he is unable to do so without experiencing considerable 
discomfort.  Since it makes no sense to represent this inability as a deficiency in physical resources, 
Cohen deems (correctly, I think) that the egalitarian intuition to compensate him, ceteris paribus, for the 
sake of fairness, is one grounded in concern for his subjective welfare (Cohen 1989, 917-919).  
Unfortunately for Cohen, though, this observation amounts to another instance of equivocation in the 
present case.  Though we have good reason to think that subjective welfare is part of the metric of 
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fundamental justice, the Difference Principle is not a conception of fundamental justice.  It is a regulatory 
principle, and regulatory principles, in order to be effective guides to action, must be concerned with 
accurate interpersonal comparisons.  Unlike with fundamental justice, measurability is not external to 
regulatory justice, and thus we have good reason to exclude subjective welfare from our regulatory 
metric.    
 The above points hopefully suffice to demonstrate that Cohen’s subjective welfare and personal 
prerogative replies to the demandingness objection equivocate across his distinction between fundamental 
and regulatory justice.  Though Cohen’s initial discussion of the scope of justice concerned the extension 
of institutional regulatory principles to personal choice, a number of his replies to critics suggest that by 
the term ‘justice’ he has in mind a fundamental value, i.e., a relatively simple, defeasible concept that 
must be balanced against competing considerations before arriving at an all things considered conclusion 
about what to do.  As I’ve already noted, including welfare and adding a personal prerogative deprives the 
Difference Principle of its capacity for action guidance.  Difficulties with interpersonally comparing 
levels of job satisfaction make it impossible to accurately judge when compensation for labor burdens is 
warranted and determining the extent to which a personal prerogative justifies deviating from the 
Difference Principle is nearly as difficult.  In short, the requirements of a welfare inclusive, prerogative 
constrained Difference Principle are not sufficiently clear for those who follow it to be able to tell when 
they’ve done enough for the worst off.   
 It should be noted that Cohen’s reflections on the relationship between publicity and fundamental 
justice confirm that he ought to be sympathetic to my worries about clarity.  On the one hand, he denies 
that publicity is a constraint on the content of fundamental justice.  He correctly notes that an action or 
policy may qualify as just even if it is not possible to tell that it is, in fact, just.  He does maintain, 
however, that publicity is a desideratum relevant to the implementation of justice, or in other words, that 
it is a consideration which good regulatory principles must be responsive to.  He even notes that it is 
sometimes appropriate to prioritize publicity over fundamental justice in cases where the two come into 
conflict.  As such, the lack of clarity associated with a welfare inclusive, prerogative constrained 
Difference Principle is problematic in light of a desideratum that Cohen himself affirms.xviii 
 To be fair, the fact that a regulatory principle lacks clarity is not necessarily a decisive strike 
against it.  Clarity, because of its relationship with publicity and action guidance, is an important 
desideratum of regulatory principles, but that’s different from being a strict constraint.  As with other 
desiderata, it is reasonable to trade-off clarity against competing considerations, and thus it might be 
argued that Cohen’s version of the Difference Principle is justified in spite of the difficulties I’ve raised.xix  
However, it must be acknowledged that lack of clarity is a drawback.  Ceteris paribus, a clear regulatory 
principle is better than an unclear one.xx  Furthermore, I think that lack of clarity is a more significant 
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problem than it may appear to be at first glance.  Combined with the concerns I’ve raised in this section, 
the connection I draw in the next section between clarity and distributive fairness should suffice to 
undermine Cohen’s claim that the Difference Principle is suitable for the context of personal choice. 
4.  Clarity and Fairness 
Thus far, we’ve discussed two reasons for why the clarity of a regulatory principle matters.  One reason is 
that the function of a regulatory principle is to guide action, and a lack of clarity undermines this.  
Another reason is that a lack of clarity compromises publicity.  A further reason not yet discussed is that 
attempting to follow an unclear principle has distributive consequences.  Some people will inadvertently 
do more than is required of them and some will inadvertently do less, and this in turn leads to unfairness.  
A good way to understand the unfairness I have in mind is with reference to Cohen’s (and my) favorite 
conception of distributive fairness: Luck Egalitarianism.  Luck Egalitarianism, as the reader may know, 
states that inequalities are unfair unless they’re traceable to choice.xxi  It is a highly controversial position: 
one that has been extensively criticized and defended.xxii Though it is beyond the scope of my paper to 
defend the claim that Luck Egalitarianism is compelling when understood specifically as a conception of 
distributive fairness, I employ the principle of luck equality here for two reasons.  My first reason is that 
Cohen himself maintains that Luck Egalitarianism is a compelling conception of the fairness input that 
comprises part of the Difference Principle’s justification (Cohen 2008, 7, 271, and 300-302), and thus 
using it in my internal critique of his assault on Rawls’s basic structure restriction is appropriate (internal 
to Cohen’s contemporary body of work, that is).  Though it might seem odd to claim that luck equality 
supports the Difference Principle, the claim is more plausible than it appears at first glance.  First, the 
Difference Principle is responsive to the fact that one cannot be held responsible for the socio-economic 
group into which one is born, as it requires that the distribution of opportunities between individuals with 
different group membership, but the same talents and ambitions, be equal.  Second, it recognizes that 
natural talents are largely the product of genetic luck, and thus that there are reasons of fairness to limit 
the extent of their distributive influence.  Third, though the Difference Principle permits some inequality 
between those with productive talents and those without them, Rawls qualifies this with a caveat.  The 
justifiability of inequalities consistent with the Difference Principle is contingent upon it being the case 
that those inequalities not be too great.  If it turned out that the realization of equal liberty and fair 
equality of opportunity were not enough to limit the size of inequalities necessary to improve the position 
of the worst off, then the Difference Principle would not be justified (Rawls 1971, 157-158).  In sum, the 
Difference Principle’s commitment to fair equality of opportunity and the mitigation of genetic luck’s 
distributive impact, combined with the justificatory assumption that distributive inequalities traceable to 
genetic luck will be limited in size, makes it a pretty reasonable regulatory principle from the perspective 
of luck equality.  It does not, in various respects, mirror the requirements of luck equality precisely, e.g., 
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it allows for ‘necessary’ inequalities between differently talented citizens;xxiii and it is insensitive to the 
fact that some citizens are worse off due to imprudence or to life-style choices, rather than to lack of 
talent.  But as a regulatory principle, it is not supposed to precisely mirror the requirements of distributive 
fairness.  Good regulatory principles must reflect a variety of considerations, and thus it is a virtue of the 
Difference Principles that it’s responsive to not only distributive fairness, but also to considerations of 
efficiency, community, stability, measurability, etc.      
 My second reason for employing Luck Egalitarianism is that it does a good job of capturing 
what’s morally problematic about adopting unclear regulatory principles for the personal context.  When 
the Luck Egalitarian standard is used to evaluate the effects of applying the Difference Principle to 
personal choice, it’s clear that there’s an important sense in which the Difference Principle falls short of 
it. Since committed citizens are unable to determine when they’ve done enough to fulfill the requirements 
of a welfare inclusive, prerogative constrained Difference Principle, the regulatory application of said 
principle to personal choice runs contrary to luck equality in an important way.  Its lack of clarity 
inevitably yields unchosen inequality in the distribution of burden, as some people will inadvertently take 
on a greater burden than is required of them by the Difference Principle, while others will inadvertently 
take on a lesser burden than is required of them.  Of course, the Difference Principle, as a regulatory 
principle, always falls short of perfect fairness.  This is because taking all things into consideration means 
deviating from the requirements of fairness for the sake feasibility and competing values.  The unfairness 
I’ve identified is different, however.  It doesn’t lie in the fact that the Difference Principle is insensitive to 
differences between members of the worst off group, or in the fact that it allows for necessary inequalities 
between differently talented citizens, but rather in the effect its unclear application to personal choice has 
on the distribution of burden.  An ethos based on the Difference Principle thus deviates from luck equality 
in a way that’s independent from the familiar, content specific deviations.     
 It might be objected that ethotic commitment to the Difference Principle is always a matter of 
choice, just as any unenforced moral requirement is.  If so, then how are inequalities in the level of ethotic 
contribution to the worst off unfair?  Citizens choose whether to commit themselves to the Difference 
Principle, and thus any accidental inequality in the associated distribution of burden is produced by option 
luck.xxiv   
 Though it’s true that citizens choose whether or not to apply the Difference Principle in their 
personal lives, I don’t think it’s appropriate to treat inequalities indirectly associated with the choice to 
commit one’s self to the Difference Principle as standard cases of option luck inequality.  In standard 
cases of option luck, the choices made are not supposed to be morally obligatory.  Whether the poker 
player decides to bet her money or merely play for fun is her prerogative.  The naturally talented follower 
of the Difference Principle, in contrast, has an alleged moral duty to promote the interests of the worst off.  
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What’s more, unlike the voluntarily acquired duties associated with contracts or friendships, her duty is a 
product of her circumstances.  After all, the talented person did not choose to have the natural capacities 
she does, and thus did not choose to be put in a position where doing the right thing would require that 
she make voluntary sacrifices.  As a result, she cannot be held responsible in the usual way for the 
consequences of her choice to follow the Difference Principle.  
 The problem I’ve raised here is similar to a problem raised by Susan Hurley.  Like me, Hurley 
argues that there’s a tension between Cohen’s luck egalitarianism and his canonical critique of Rawls.  
More specifically, she claims that there’s a tension between (a) claiming that inequalities traceable to 
choice should remain intact, and (b) claiming that justice prohibits providing incentives and yet requires 
the talented to work just as hard as they counter-factually would have (Hurley 2003, 212-216).  On the 
plausible assumption that the productivity of the talented is at least partially traceable to their choices (an 
assumption that’s actually presupposed by the claim that the talented are morally required to work just as 
hard without incentives), doesn’t luck egalitarianism suggest that the talented are entitled to a larger 
portion of the extra goods generated by their efforts?  It seems that luck egalitarians are committed to 
saying as much since it is unfair, on their view, to eliminate inequalities traceable to choice.  
 Cohen’s reply to Hurley is fairly simple.  He maintains that a choice-based justification for socio-
economic inequality is different from an incentive-based justification, and that his critique of incentives 
only condemns the latter (Cohen 2008, 403-406).  In other words, while a personal commitment to the 
Difference Principle would not permit talented workers to make incentives necessary by refusing to work 
just as hard without them; nothing prevents those workers from concluding that they are entitled to more 
resources than those who work less.  Of course, such a justification would also apply to hard working 
citizens who lack productive talents, and thus it is a justification for socio-economic inequality between 
those who choose to work hard and those who choose not to, rather than a justification for inequality 
between the talented and the untalented. 
 Though Cohen is right to distinguish choice-based justifications for (non-luck) inequality from 
incentive-based justifications, it seems to me that citizens committed to the Difference Principle are 
required to reject the former just as much as they are required to reject the latter.  After all, the Difference 
Principle does not distinguish between those who are worse-off due to choice and those who are worse-
off due to bad luck.  Though fair equality of opportunity and a concern for mitigating the distributive 
effects of the genetic lottery are broadly consistent with the requirements of luck equality, the Difference 
Principle is not a form of luck egalitarianism.  Unlike a principle of luck equality, it is insensitive to 
choice related differences between members of the same socio-economic class: it simply specifies that 
any inequalities must be necessary to benefit those who have less, regardless of why they have less.  As a 
result, the Difference Principle condemns unnecessary inequality of any sort, not just those between the 
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talented and the untalented, but also between those who work hard and those who don’t.  The upshot is 
that citizens who accept reward on the ground that they’ve chosen to work harder than others would be 
permitting an unnecessary inequality.  In light of this, it seems to me that we have yet another way in 
which an ethos based on the Difference Principle deviates from the requirements of luck equality.  Not 
only would such an ethos create unchosen inequality in the distribution of burden between those 
committed to it, but it denies them a choice-based justification for retaining extra resources.  Of course, 
Cohen’s version of the Difference Principle is a bit different from the standard version.  As we’ve noted 
throughout, his Difference Principle is a welfare inclusive, prerogative constrained principle.  As such, it 
is consistent with both personal prerogative and labor burden justifications for retaining extra resources, 
even if it isn’t consistent with incentive or choice-based justifications.  Whether or not the amount 
justified by a personal prerogative or by compensation for labor burden would be less than the amount 
justified by a choice-based justification is difficult to say.  However, the fact that the hardworking 
talented are able to retain extra resources via alternative justificatory routes suggests that unchosen 
inequality of burden is the more pressing deviation from luck equality.	
 Unfairness is always regrettable, but it may also be the case that a certain amount of unfairness in 
the distribution of regulatory burden is unavoidable in the personal context.  If so, then so be it.  
Shouldn’t we try to minimize this unfairness in so far as we can, though?  Is it possible to leave space for 
affection, self-interest, loyalty, etc., without also sacrificing clarity?  In what follows, I examine Peter 
Singer’s public standard of assistance in hopes of shedding some light on what a clear, easy-to-follow 
alternative might look like.  My goal is not so much to defend Singer’s standard, but rather to draw 
attention to its virtues so that they might be taken into consideration in future efforts to determine what, 
exactly, are the regulatory principles best suited for the personal context.     
5. Regulatory Principles for the Personal Context 
In The Life You Can Save, Peter Singer acknowledges that the moral principle he famously defends in 
“Famine Affluence and Morality” is, in a sense, too demanding (2010, 151-173).  Though he continues to 
maintain that we are morally required to prevent bad occurrences, e.g., starvation and preventable disease 
in the Global South, whenever we can do so without giving up anything of comparable moral 
importance,xxv he also admits that using such a standard to determine whether a person should be blamed 
for their behavior is likely to have a discouraging effect.  Since the principle he defends requires the 
psychologically prodigious task of giving to the point where one is nearly as impoverished as those one 
seeks to help (at least in the absence of widespread compliance), blaming those who fall short is likely to 
discourage many people from trying at all.  To address this problem, Singer suggests that praise and 
blame should be accorded with reference to a more modest standard.  More specifically, better off 
individuals should be publicly expected to donate a determinate and comparatively small percentage of 
14 
 
their income to poverty relief.  The percentage they’re expected to donate depends on their particular 
income bracket, and rates are set progressively in order to ensure that those at the bottom end of a higher 
bracket are not expected to accept a lower net income than those at the upper end of the bracket 
immediately below them.  The following table provides an example of the sort of standard Singer has in 
mind:xxvi       
Yearly Income Donation 
65, 000 - 100, 000 2.5%  
100, 001 - 150, 000  2.5% of the first 100, 000 and 5% of the remainder 
150, 001 - 400, 000  2.5% of the first 100, 000; 5% of the next  50, 000 
and 10% of the remainder 
400, 001 - 1, 000, 000 2.5% of the first 100, 000; 5% of the next  50, 000; 
10% of the next 250, 000 and 15% of the remainder   
Over 1, 000, 000 2.5% of the first 100, 000; 5% of the next  50, 000; 
10% of the next 250, 000; 15% of the next 600, 000 
and 20% of the remainder   
 
 What Singer’s after with his public standard is similar to what I’m after in my search for a 
compelling alternative to the Difference Principle.  There are also important differences, though.  First, 
Singer’s standard targets global poverty, whereas the standard I’m after is concerned with what co-
citizens owe to one another.  Though questions about what we owe to distant strangers are certainly 
important, they lie beyond the scope of my paper.  Second, I don’t endorse Singer’s distinction between 
what morality actually requires and what we ought to be publicly supporting.  For Singer, demandingness 
is a problem primarily because of its discouraging psychological effects.  According to him, promoting a 
less demanding standard is a more effective way of encouraging people to give than promoting a more 
demanding standard.  As such, Singer’s public standard is an indirect strategy for (partially) implementing 
the more demanding standard’s requirements (Singer 2010, 150-154).  By contrast, I think the factors that 
make an action guiding standard too demanding also undermine its claim to moral correctness.  My worry 
is not that the Difference Principle’s demandingness will discourage compliance, but rather that said 
principle doesn’t leave sufficient space for affection, self-interest, loyalty, etc.  An alternative is needed 
because the Difference Principle misrepresents what citizens are obligated to do for each other in their 
daily lives, not because promoting some other principle is a more effective way to implement the 
Difference Principle’s requirements.     
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 Despite the above differences between Singer and myself, I think his efforts to formulate a 
standard the content of which is responsive to the problem of demandingness provides a useful starting 
point when thinking about alternatives to Cohen’s welfare inclusive, prerogative constrained Difference 
Principle.  Widespread commitment to a standard modeled on Singer’s would benefit the worst off socio-
economic group and reduce the size of the inequality between differently talented citizens.  What’s more, 
it would provide clear guidance and thus avoid creating any unchosen inequalities in the distribution of 
regulatory burden.  Rather than trying to guess how much is required of them, citizens need only refer to 
the above table and perform some relatively simple calculations to determine how much they should be 
donating to the worst off.   
 One worry is that Singer’s public standard asks too little of talented citizens.  Arguably those who 
are modestly rich ought to give more than just 5% or 10% of their incomes to the worst-off (I assume the 
highest brackets in the above table aren’t applicable, since a society whose institutions conform to 
Rawls’s principles of justice shouldn’t have any ‘super rich’ citizens).  Though it may indeed be the case 
that 5% or 10% is too low, it’s worth noting that Singer’s standard isn’t meant to be static.  He’s careful 
to note that what counts as too demanding is socially and culturally relative, and thus that the standard’s 
demands can reasonably be increased in so far as we succeed in cultivating a culture of giving.  One 
simple and easy way to promote such a culture is by talking (and perhaps tweeting) about the standard 
with one’s friends, family, co-workers, etc.  Discussing the standard, one’s reasons for following it, and 
the sense of fulfillment one (hopefully) gets out of giving will encourage others to follow it and also help 
to normalize the ideas that voluntary giving is an important part of leading a morally fulfilling life.  In so 
far as citizens begin to see giving as one of the personal goals that make life meaningful, rather than as a 
burdensome moral task in conflict with those personal goals, then the requirements of our standard can be 
increased without being unreasonably demanding (Singer 2010, 150-154).  In fact, it may be the case that 
a culture of giving is likely to prevail under Rawlsian institutions.xxvii         
 In spite of its virtues, whether a standard modeled on Singer’s is the best alternative to a welfare 
inclusive, prerogative constrained Difference Principle is still an open question.  I merely offer Singer’s 
standard as a promising example of how we might make space for affection, self-interest, loyalty, etc., 
without also compromising clarity. 
6.  Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the purpose of this paper has been to assess Cohen’s attack on the basic structure 
restriction, particularly his replies to the problem of demandingness.  I argued that it makes sense to 
include subjective welfare in the metric of fundamental justice and to balance considerations such as 
affection, self-interest, and loyalty against fundamental justice when applying it to the context of personal 
choice; but I also argued that these moves become problematic when it’s acknowledged that the issue 
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being debated is whether the Difference Principle – a principle of regulatory justice - extends to personal 
choice (hence my claim that Cohen equivocates).  As Andrew Williams persuasively argues, a welfare 
inclusive, prerogative constrained Difference Principle is not sufficiently clear to meet Rawls’s publicity 
condition.  What’s more, it is incapable of providing clear guidance to those who would seek to follow it.  
Considering that action guidance is a key function of regulatory principles, the latter problem is perhaps 
especially concerning.  Finally, lack of clarity leads to unchosen inequality of burden, as some followers 
of the Difference Principle would inadvertently do more than is required of them and some would do less.  
As a result, the Difference Principle is less fair in the personal context than it is in the institutional 
context.  In light of the various problems that attend lack of clarity, I concluded that we have good reason 
to look for an alternative to Cohen’s welfare inclusive, prerogative constrained Difference Principle.  
Since Peter Singer’s public standard of assistance manages to respond to the problem of demandingness 
without also sacrificing clarity, his work seems like a good place to start in our search for distributive 
regulatory principles well-suited to the personal context.   
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i Reprinted with minor revisions as chapter 1 of Cohen (2008).   
ii Reprinted with minor revisions as chapter 3 of Cohen (2008).  For recent discussions of Cohen’s critique of 
incentives and the basic structure restriction, see Estlund (1998); Williams (1998); Murphy (1999); Pogge (2000); J. 
Cohen (2002); Julius (2003); Tan (2004); Scheffler (2006); Titelbaum (2008); Shiffrin (2010); and Schouten (2013).   
iii For Rawls’s comments on the difference between the concept of justice and conceptions of justice, see Rawls 
(1971), 5-6.  That there’s a disagreement between Rawls and Cohen over the concept of justice is something 
Thomas Scanlon suggested back in 2006.  Since then, Cohen’s book Rescuing Justice and Equality has made this 
abundantly clear, and authors commenting on it have voiced agreement.  See Scanlon (2006), 85-87; Williams 
(2008), 122-124; Quong (2010), 336-340; Ripstein (2010), 669-687; Tomlin (2010), 228-235 and 240-246; and 
Tomlin (2012). 
iv For my earlier thoughts about the relationship between Cohen’s theses, see Johannsen (2013).  
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v Though the relationship between fact-dependence and a principle’s scope of application is relevant to my paper, 
I’ve discussed that subject at some length elsewhere.  Here, I concern myself with the particular details of the debate 
between Cohen and his opponents, and the manner in which those details relate to the distinction between 
fundamental values and regulatory principles.  For a discussion of the general relationship between fact-dependence 
and scope of application, see Johannsen (2013), 139-43.   
vi For an interesting paper exploring the possibility that eventual widespread access to genetic technologies may 
have positive or negative implications for the cultivation of an egalitarian ethos, see Feeney (2012), esp. 93-98.   
vii The above exegesis of the ‘basic structure objection’ and Cohen’s critique of incentives appears in Johannsen 
(2013), 136.  
viii  Cohen’s critique of the basic structure restriction is not entirely internal, however.  In addition to the above 
described internal criticism, he also suggests (at least implicitly) that, conceptually speaking, it is problematic to 
claim that only a society’s institutions are relevant to assessing the extent to which it is just.  To see why, compare a 
society with both just institutions and an ethos of justice to a society which only possesses just institutions.  Isn’t the 
former society more just than the latter one?  If so, then whether citizens possess an ethos of justice is pertinent to 
whether the society they live in is just.  This may be true instrumentally via the casual relationship between a 
society’s ethos and the distributive pattern that obtains within it, and/or it may be non-instrumentally true via a 
constitutive connection between the character of a society’s ethos and whether that society counts as just.  See 
Cohen (2008), 124-129 and 377-381.       
ix For an articulation of the demandingness critique, see Pogge (2000), 152-154 and 163-164.  For other discussions 
of this worry, see Van Parijs (1993); Tan (2004); and Titelbaum (2008). 
x I borrow the terms “input” and “output” from Patrick Tomlin.  See Tomlin (2010), 232.   
xi For discussions of the distinction between evaluative claims and normative claims, see Lawford-Smith (2010), 
357-361; Gilabert (2011), 55-59; Tomlin (2012), 377-378 and 383-385; and Valentini (2012), 657-658. 
xii See, for example, Cohen (2008), 315-330 
xiii See also Cohen (2008), 7, 271 and 300-302.   
xiv See endnote 9 of the present paper. 
xv See also David Estlund’s comment about the breadth of Cohen’s personal prerogative in Estlund (1998), 101-102.  
For Cohen’s reply, see Cohen (2008), 390-391.   
xvi The above description of the demandingness objection and Cohen’s personal prerogative appears in Johannsen 
(2013), 143. 
xvii It’s worth noting that Cohen makes a further qualification in light of the below discussed issues of clarity and 
publicity raised by Andrew Williams.  In particular, Cohen notes that it is unreasonable to expect citizens to do 
something when, because of informational barriers, they are unable to tell that the Difference Principle requires it of 
them.  Though noting as much serves to remove the worry that an ethos of justice requires blaming citizens who fail 
to fulfill epistemically inaccessible obligations, a number of additional problems attend lack of clarity.  I discuss 
these problems at length throughout the present paper.  For the above mentioned qualification, see Cohen (2008), 
371.             
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xviii  See Cohen’s discussion of publicity in Cohen (2008), 323-327. 
xix For his argument against the claim that clarity is a strict constraint on regulatory principles, see Cohen (2008), 
351-354.      
xx I concede, however, that there are certain cases where clarity is not a virtue, e.g., it’s probably good, all things 
being equal, that the norms governing drink buying between friends at the pub are somewhat vague.  For his 
discussion of such cases, see Cohen (2008), 353-354.     
xxi For canonical articulations of Luck Egalitarianism, see Arneson (1989); Cohen (1989); and Dworkin (2000). 
xxii For prominent criticisms, see Wolff (1998); Anderson (1999); and Scheffler (2003).  For some recent defenses, 
see Brown (2005); Knight (2005); Barry (2006); and Tan (2008).    
xxiii Here, I assume that “necessary” socio-economic inequality between differently talented citizens is a deviation 
from luck equality.  The extent to which my assumption is true, however, depends on the extent to which differences 
of talent are a matter of circumstance, as well as on the extent to which socio-economic inequality between 
differently talented citizens is traceable to the fact that they’re differently talented.  Since one’s endowment of 
talents is partially the product of choices about training and education, and since whether to engage in productive 
work is itself a choice, it’s reasonable to claim that some of the inequality between differently talented citizens is not 
luck inequality.  
xxiv I owe thanks to Ryan McSheffrey for raising this objection.   
xxv For the original statement of this principle, see Singer (1972), 231. 
xxvi The table I’ve created is similar to one that Singer himself uses.  For Singer’s table, see page 164 of Singer 
(2010). 
xxvii  For a discussion of the causal relationship between just institutions and the development of an ethos of justice, 
see J. Cohen (2002).  For G.A. Cohen’s thoughts on the matter, see Cohen (2008), 377-381.   
